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Abstract: Treves et al. (2019) make a convincing case that conservation efforts need to go
beyond an anthropocentric worldview. Implementing that vision, however, will require human
advocates to represent nonhuman interests. Where will the knowledge of those interests come
from? How can humans know what is in the best interest of another animal, a plant, or an
ecosystem? We discuss how the values embedded in current scientific practices may be ill-suited
to representing nonhuman interests and we offer some ideas for correcting these shortcomings.
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Treves et al. (2019) observe that the current values dominating conservation biology —
anthropocentrism, speciesism, and instrumentalism — are destabilizing planetary health. Along
with several of the commentators (Attfield, 2019; Baker, 2019; Washington, 2019) and in line
with the existing literature (Crist, 2014; Jensen, 2016; Meijer, 2019), we heartily agree with this
diagnosis. As part of the treatment plan, Treves et al. envision a court that enacts multispecies
justice by appointing advocate-trustees who have been “well-trained in the capabilities and
variable sensory, cognitive, and socio-emotional capacities of the non-humans they represent.”
However, as conservation biologists, the authors admit to having little to say about how such
advocate-trustees will gain the information needed to carry out their mandate. We pick up
where Treves et al. leave off by asking: What science will serve nonhuman interests best? We
focus on animal behavior science, our field of study, but we believe that the issues and
principles discussed here apply more broadly to any program of research aimed at
understanding the interests of its subjects.
As Treves et al. point out, the values that scientists hold matter. Values drive research
questions, methodological choices, statistical interpretation, and the framing of results; despite
being ignored (or denied when science is touted as “value-free”), values can influence empirical
knowledge as much as the data (Midgley, 2001). In the quest for information about the interests
of nonhuman animals, the values driving the science can amplify human presuppositions about
nonhuman lives.
Animal welfare science — which, as a field aiming to improve the lives of nonhuman
animals, is a natural place to turn for understanding animal interests — tends to use industry
standards (e.g., indoor housing for dairy cows, shoe-box cages for rats) as default husbandry
practices. Although this value enables the field to generate practical, near-term solutions to
alleviate animal suffering in existing systems, it may be less useful for understanding animal
interests per se (Franks, 2019; Yeates, Röcklinsberg, & Gjerris, 2011). In valuing the systems of
use over the interests of the animals themselves, questions about preferences for mate
selection, reproductive control, autonomy, exploration, discovery, learning, positive emotion,
multispecies interaction, and stable social groups are usually not tested. Restrictive treatment
can even constrain animals’ behavioral, cognitive, and emotional potential, diminishing the
expression of their interests because of anhedonia and disengagement (Franks, Champagne, &
Higgins, 2013; Fureix & Meagher, 2015).
Modern animal scientists are trained to think and write in ways that deny animal
sentience (Crist, 1999; Lestel, 2014); hence they rarely engage in debates in animal ethics
(Webb, Woodford, & Huchard, 2019). Similar impediments to adequately representing animal
interests exist across most animal science subfields. At a minimum, to determine the interests of
another individual requires (1) accepting the individual has interests (rather than being just a
collection of mechanistic processes) and (2) giving the individual the opportunity to discover and
convey their interests. Asking anthropocentric, mechanistic questions and treating individuals in
a detached, callous way, animal behavior science can undermine rather than unveil nonhuman
interests.
Fortunately, there is growing recognition of the need for new values and practices,
exemplified by the compassionate conservation movement (Ramp & Bekoff, 2015), positive
animal welfare (Lawrence, Vigors, & Sandøe, 2019; Mellor, 2019), and novel ethological
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frameworks pioneered by Vinciane Despret, Dominique Lestel, and Roberto Marchesini
(Bussolini, 2013). To represent nonhuman animal interests adequately, scientists will need to
give priority to those interests, as follows:
1. Use language that recognizes and respects animal sentience (Crist, 1999)
2. Pay attention to the ethical implications of the work — both the immediate concerns of the
individuals involved in the research and its longer-term, broader consequences (Washington,
2019; Webb et al., 2019)
3. Allow the interests to be sophisticated and diverse:
a. Learning, agency, choosing, creating (Franks, 2018; Franks & Higgins, 2012; Lestel &
Herzfeld, 2005; Špinka, 2019)
b. Forming intraspecific and interspecific friendships (Lestel & Taylor, 2013; Sridhar &
Guttal, 2018)
c. Diverging from human interests (e.g., the importance of smell to dogs (Duranton &
Horowitz, 2019)
4. Rely on sources of knowledge that are currently perceived as unconventional:
a. Personal, empathetic connection and intersubjectivity with study subjects
(Bradshaw, 2010; Bussolini, 2013; Lestel, 2014; Smuts, 2001; Wels, 2013)
b. Local and indigenous knowledge (Jino et al., 2018)
c. Anecdotes and critical anthropomorphism (Bates & Byrne, 2007; Bekoff, 2006;
Burghardt, 1991)
5. Transdisciplinary collaboration, especially with philosophers, political scientists, and cultural
and legal scholars

As other commentators have noted, the legal and ethical foundations on which conservation
biology is built require further debate (Gupta, 2019; Palmer & Fischer, 2019). Regardless of the
underlying structure, however, the question of how to determine nonhuman interests will
remain. Existing scientific practices were not designed with those interests in mind; they instead
favor academic trends (e.g., positivism; Fraser, 2009), existing institutions (e.g., human
exceptionalism; Chapman & Huffman, 2018), or profit (e.g., animal agriculture). To meet the
modern crises of climate change, environmental pollution and degradation, and mass species
extinction, animal interests (including the interests of the particular animals involved in the
research) must be given priority over external considerations.
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Special Issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies
Plant Sentience: Theoretical and Empirical Issues
Guest Editors: Vicente Raja (Rotman Institute of Philosophy, Western University)
Miguel Segundo-Ortin (School of Liberal Arts, University of Wollongong)
In this special issue, we address the issue of plant sentience/consciousness from different
disciplines that combine both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Some of the
questions to be addressed in the special issue include the following:
•
•
•
•
•

Plants exhibit interesting behaviors; does this entail that they are conscious to some
extent?
What are the requirements for a living organism to be conscious? Do plants meet
these requirements?
What does the possibility of plant sentience/consciousness entail for the study of
the evolution of consciousness?
Is it just a categorical mistake to attribute consciousness to plants?
Can we talk about different levels or degrees of consciousness?
How to submit?
Deadline: June 1st, 2020

Please submit your papers (max. 9000 words including footnotes, references, abstract, etc.) to
vgalian@uwo.ca with subject “Paper Special Issue JCS”.
For more information, including bibliography and more detailed descriptions of the topics
and questions to be addressed in the papers submitted to the special issue, please contact
the guest editors at vgalian@uwo.ca (Vicente) or mso693@uowmail.edu.au (Miguel).
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